Beyond managerial talent: ‘key group’ identification and differential compensation practices in multinational companies by McDonnell, Anthony et al.
Beyond managerial talent: ‘key group’ identification and differential
compensation practices in multinational companies
McDonnell, A., Gunnigle, P., Lavelle, J., & Lamare, R. (2016). Beyond managerial talent: ‘key group’
identification and differential  compensation practices in multinational companies. International Journal of Human
Resource Management. DOI: 10.1080/09585192.2015.1075571
Published in:
International Journal of Human Resource Management
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal
Publisher rights
© 2015 Taylor & Francis.
The Version of Record of this manuscript has been published and is available in International Journal of Human Resource Management
2016 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09585192.2015.1075571
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:06. Nov. 2017
1 
 
Beyond managerial talent: ‘key group’ identification and differential 
compensation practices in multinational companies 
 
 
Anthony McDonnell♣ 
Queen’s University Management School 
Queen’s University Belfast, 185 Stranmillis Road, 
Belfast, Northern Ireland, 
BT9 5EE.  
 a.mcdonnell@qub.ac.uk  
 
Patrick Gunnigle & Jonathan Lavelle 
Kemmy Business School, 
University of Limerick, 
Ireland. 
 
Ryan Lamare 
Department of Labor Studies and Employment Relations 
Penn State University 
University Park, PA  16802 
USA 
 
 
 
                                                 
♣ Corresponding author 
2 
 
Abstract 
With the maturation of strategic human resource management scholarship there 
appears to be a greater call to move from monolithic workforce management to a 
more strategic and differentiated emphasis on employees with the greatest capacity to 
enhance competitive advantage. There has been little consideration in the literature as 
to whether organizations formally identify key groups of employees based on their 
impact on organisational learning and core competences. Using survey evidence from 
260 multinational companies (MNCs), this paper explores the extent to which key 
groups of employees are formally recognized and whether they are subject to 
differential compensation practices. The results demonstrate that just in excess of half 
of these MNCs identify a key group. There was considerable differentiation in the 
compensation practices between these key groups, managers and the largest 
occupational group in the workforce. The results give rise to questions worthy of 
future investigation namely, whether the differentiated approaches used lead to 
improved performance outcomes?  
 
Keywords 
Key group, compensation practices, Ireland, multinational company, rewards, 
strategic HRM, talent management. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Drawing on resource-based theory (RBT), the strategic human resource management 
(HRM) literature proposes that there is much benefit to be derived from a preferential 
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focus on employees with the greatest capacity to enhance firm performance and 
competitive advantage. Empirical support regarding the use of a differentiated 
approach relates largely to managerial talent compared to the rest of the workforce 
(McDonnell, Lamare, Gunnigle and Lavelle 2010). In effect, the scholarly focus has 
been primarily on identifying, and preferentially developing and compensating, 
existing and potential future leaders and senior managers. In recent times, the 
emergence of the talent management literature has further embellished the focus on 
pivotal staff (e.g. Collings and Mellahi 2009) and argues for a disproportionate 
investment in such employees (Boudreau and Ramstad, 2005; Becker, Huselid and 
Beatty 2009). This literature has to a large degree been precipitated by concerns over 
talent shortages across the developed and developing world (cf. Schuler, Jackson and 
Tarique 2011).  
 
In this paper we contend that insufficient attention has been dedicated to employee 
categories, beyond managerial talent, that also possess the potential to significantly 
contribute to competitive advantage, and the extent to which differentiated HR 
approaches are implemented. A related concern, first raised by Becker and Huselid 
(2006), is that the literature currently emphasizes the strategic advantage of focusing 
on individual employees deemed to have senior management potential, without giving 
sufficient consideration to the need to develop and invest in cohorts of employees 
intrinsically involved in other roles related to core competencies within an 
organization. In other words, disproportionate emphasis has focused on the value of 
individual employees to firms without commensurate consideration afforded to the 
contributions of key cohorts, or groups, of employees. Yanadori and Marler (2006) 
focused on the compensation strategies of strategic employee groups but their 
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approach was based on the premise that research and development (R&D) jobs 
represented a key group without empirically testing whether the organization formally 
identified such a category of staff in this light. While R&D jobs may very well 
represent strategic employee groups, we posit that other critical groups may also exist, 
especially across organizations operating in different sectors. Further, what may 
ostensibly appear to be a key group of employees based on their job level or position 
may not necessarily mean that organizations formally identify them as critical to the 
firm’s core competence.  
 
The paper draws on data collected from a large-scale, representative survey of HRM 
practices employed by MNCs to advance understanding of the extent to which key 
groups of employees are formally recognized and the compensation strategy that is 
applied. For the purpose of this study the key groups were defined as employees that 
may be identified [by the respondent] as critical to a firm’s organizational learning 
and core competence. Such groups may refer to research staff, product designers, 
major account handlers and so forth. Participants were then able to self-select if they 
formally recognized such a grouping. The objectives of this paper are twofold. First, 
we establish the extent to which MNCs deliberately recognize strategic employee 
groups that are considered vital to competitive advantage, thereby helping to 
counterbalance the evident focus to date on managerial and leadership development 
and succession. Second, we systematically investigate whether these key groups are 
subject to differentiated compensation practices vis-à-vis managers and the largest 
occupational group (i.e. largest non-managerial occupational group). The primary 
focus here is on whether there is differentiation in compensation strategy, often 
viewed as motivation enhancing HR practices (Kaifeng et al. 2012; Lepak et al. 
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2006). Consequently, the paper engages with Becker and Huselid’s (2006) and Lepak 
and Snell’s (1999, 2002) contention that an organization’s workforce should not be 
treated as one large monolith but rather as comprising groups or categories of staff 
who vary in terms of their putative strategic value and for whom differing HR 
approaches may be utilized (also see Boxall and Purcell 2003).  
 
We begin by reviewing relevant literature to clarify both the focus and contribution of 
our paper. We then describe the methodology employed, the constructs used and the 
statistical analysis undertaken. Following this, we present our findings. Finally, we 
discuss the results taking cognizance of the extant literature, and outline some 
pertinent conclusions. 
 
2. Key employees groups – the elusive ‘X factor’ for organizations? 
The underlying theoretical framework on which this paper is grounded is RBT. More 
specifically, we draw on research that applies RBT to HRM through the ideas of 
differentiated HR architectures for different employee categories (cf. Tsui, Pearce, 
Porter and Tripoli 1997; Lepak and Snell 1999, 2002). The talent management 
literature provides further support around organizations appropriating their resources 
more strategically in terms of important employees and roles (Boudreau and Ramstad 
2005; Collings and Mellahi 2009; McDonnell 2011).  
 
RBT contends that sustainable competitive advantage can be achieved through the 
development of internal resources that are valuable, rare and difficult to imitate 
(Barney 1991, 1995, 2001). Such resources may include, ‘all of financial, physical, 
human, and organizational assets used by a firm to develop, manufacture, and deliver 
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products or services to its customers’ (Barney 1995, p. 50). High quality human 
capital is often considered to satisfy the requirements set down by RBT (Takeuchi, 
Lepak, Wang and Takeuchi 2007) with the inimitability of resources particularly 
important in arguing that human capital can lead to sustainable competitive 
advantage. Employees are widely seen as a key means through which organizations 
ultimately develop capacity and skills, formal and tacit knowledge, and build 
relationships and networks. In particular, knowledge-based resources are seen as more 
idiosyncratic to the firm in which they reside (Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993).  
 
Under RBT, managerial talent is unsurprisingly typically viewed as the most 
significant of human capital sources due to the predominantly tacit nature of their 
skills and the impact they have on setting and realizing the corporate objectives 
(Thompson and Heron 2005). Consequently, by definition, strong managerial and 
leadership capability will be difficult to replicate. It is against this backdrop, along 
with supply/demand concerns, that talent management has emerged as a prominent 
topic in the practitioner and academic lexicon. 
 
In this paper we argue for greater consideration of high value human capital sources 
beyond just managerial talent. The primary value of employees derives from their 
capacity to contribute to the achievement of business strategies and to take advantage 
of the opportunities, and reduce the threats that arise in the marketplace (Barney 1991; 
Gonzáález and Tacorante 2004). ‘The uniqueness of human capital, or firm 
specificity, implies skills or knowledge derived from idiosyncratic learning processes, 
which makes their abundance in the market improbable’ (Gonzáález and Tacorante 
2004, p. 58). While the identification and effective management of ‘star’ or ‘pivotal’ 
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individuals has received extensive attention (e.g. Groysberg 2010), much less focus 
has fallen on the extent to which organizations diagnose key or strategic groups of 
employees. We are interested here in whether groupings of key staff, beyond 
managers, who possess core competencies or knowledge considered strategically 
important to business success (Liao and Chung 2004), are identified and subject to 
differentiated management practices. Such groups may often encompass employees 
operating in non-managerial roles but who nevertheless substantially impact on 
competitive advantage through technical, product, process, customer or other 
knowledge and core competences (Thompson and Heron 2005).  
 
The extent to which organizations identify such groupings is, to our knowledge, 
unknown. Much of the scholarship on differentiated employee categories has been on 
core versus peripheral staff or managerial versus non-managerial workers (e.g. 
Jackson, Schuler and Rivero 1989). Lepak and Snell’s (2002) study examined 
differentiated architectures where the primary unit of analysis was the mode of 
employment (i.e. contract works, alliances/partnerships, knowledge-based 
employment and job-based employment). Further, and as previously highlighted, 
others (e.g. Yanadori and Marler 2006; Yanadori and Kang 2011) self-determined the 
strategic employee group according to employees being in R&D jobs or not. Thus, 
they did not delineate if the organization actually identified these as a key group or 
whether other critical groupings of employees existed. Furthermore, such studies were 
focused on only one industry ‒ a limitation addressed here. As a key tenet of RBT is 
the link between corporate strategy and an organization’s internal resources, there is 
unlikely to be strong commonality in the make-up of who these key groups are from 
organization to organization. Specific competencies may be valuable in one 
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organization but peripheral in another. In some firms major account handlers may 
possess considerable value but these may be ancillary staff in other organizations 
where perhaps product developers may be more critical.  Therefore, our first research 
question asks: To what extent do MNCs formally identify key or strategic employee 
groupings?  
 
Stiles and Kulvisaechana (2003) usefully note that identifying key employees does 
not bring competitive advantage alone but that social and organizational capital must 
also exist. In other words, employees themselves are not just a source of competitive 
advantage. They can be such a source when other factors (e.g. relationships and 
organizational capital) are taken into account. Consequently, it is important that 
organizations have effective management systems and methods of working in place, 
as well as practices to develop and reward key staff (Hutchinson and Purcell 2003). In 
so doing, staff may be enabled to make the contribution desired to facilitate the 
achievement of competitive advantage. As a result, one might, de facto, expect a 
differentiated and more sophisticated approach in the management of a key group 
compared to the largest occupational group. The ultimate logic of this line of inquiry 
is that those employees who constitute a key group would be expected to receive the 
greatest attention and investment and an enhanced compensation package, relative to 
other non-managerial employees. There may be greater similarity to managers but it 
could be argued that some variation in approach may still be expected.  
 
This argumentation fits neatly with RBT, which maintains that the most critical 
employees must be retained and their knowledge and skills absorbed within the 
organization through the development of organizational systems and routines 
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(Kamoche and Mueller 1995; Lepak and Snell 1999, 2002). The provision and 
utilization of appropriate systems and practices is vital if the knowledge and skills of 
key employees are to be leveraged appropriately (Barney 1995; Stiles and 
Kulvisaechana 2003). Consequently, coherent and integrated organizational systems 
and practices must support staff to provide added value to the organization (Boxall 
1996). Snell (2005) maintained that the most costly ‘best HR practices’ will be more 
commonly deployed among highly valued groups of employees, with a cost-control 
and more ‘minimalist’ HR approach used for other employee categories (e.g. low or 
unskilled categories). This is the essence of RBT, HR architecture and talent 
management literatures, which argue that organizations should employ differentiated 
compensation and broader HR systems and practices depending on the anticipated 
strategic contribution employees make to the organization (Becker et al. 2009; Boxall 
and Purcell 2003; Delery and Shaw 2001; Lepak and Snell 1999, 2002; Tsui et al. 
1997; Yanadori and Marler 2006). Yet, there is little consensus as to what 
differentiated HR architectures or systems look like, or the practices they should 
incorporate (Boselie, Dietz and Boon 2005). Yanadori and Kang (2011, p. 237) 
suggest that ‘there is only limited empirical evidence indicating whether or not firms 
really differentiate across employee groups when designing HRM practices’.  
 
The focus in this paper is on differentiated approaches to compensation strategy. 
Ideally, the focus would have been more holistic to incorporate aspects of recruitment, 
selection and development etc. but the nature of the study (see methodology section) 
prevented this. While a somewhat narrow view of differentiated practices is used, 
compensation practices are long established as promoting desirable worker behavior 
when appropriately designed and in keeping with business strategy (e.g. Milkovich 
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and Newman 2005). Consequently, key employee groups can be expected to receive 
‘enhanced’ rewards in an explicit effort to internalize them into the organization, 
increase their commitment and encourage superior performance (Lepak and Snell 
2002; Becker et al. 2009). Yanadori and Marler (2006) found that high technology 
firms in the US differentiate their compensation systems between R&D staff and other 
employees. Yet Yanadori and Kang (2011) surmise that overall much of the 
compensation and benefits literature is implicit on the extent to which organizations 
actually adopt discerned approaches by employee groups. In order to advance 
understanding beyond the existence of key groups and provide more explicit evidence 
on differentiated compensation practices our second research question is: Do MNCs 
employ a differentiated approach to their compensation practices according to the 
different employee groupings? 
 
3.  Methodological approach 
 
3.1 Research design 
This paper draws on data from the first large-scale, representative survey of HRM 
practices in MNCs (foreign- and indigenous-owned) operating in Ireland. In so doing, 
the study addresses the limitations of existing studies which too often lack 
comprehensiveness by failing to accurately define the population of MNCs in 
countries (see McDonnell, Lavelle, Gunnigle and Collings 2007; Collinson and 
Rugman 2010; Edwards, Marginson and Ferner 2013, for fuller discussion on this 
limitation with MNC focused research). Ireland is a worthwhile context for research 
into MNCs due to its classification as one of the world’s most globalized (Kearney 
2002; KOF 2010) and MNC-dependent economies (Gunnigle, Collings and Morley 
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2005). While there has been much discourse on Ireland’s corporate taxation rate, this 
does not exist as the sole factor that makes Ireland such an attractive location for 
foreign MNCs. Research demonstrates that MNCs establish Irish operations for a 
range of reasons including tax incentives, financial supports and subsidies from the 
state development agencies, the highly skilled workforce and location within the EU, 
and a generally ‘business friendly’ institutional environment (Gunnigle and McGuire 
2001). Despite experiencing a particularly severe economic recession, the country was 
recently ranked as the world’s second most economically globalized country (KOF 
2010), the fifteenth most competitive world economy (IMD 2014), and has 
experienced strong inward foreign investment flows despite the global financial crisis. 
While the early attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) was very much in the 
lower, value-added manufacturing industries, recent decades have seen a significant 
change in the profile of MNCs in Ireland. For example, Ireland now acts as the 
European HQ for MNEs including Google, LinkedIn, and Facebook. Even amongst 
the early firms that established manufacturing operations in Ireland, there has been 
increased, valued added activity investment in recent decades. For example, Intel, IB, 
Hewlett Packard and Boston Scientific have established significant R&D operations. 
Consequently, we believe that Ireland’s FDI profile is quite varied, making it an 
interesting context in which to study the identification of key groups.  
 
The first stage of the study involved the identification of an accurate population of 
MNCs. Indigenous-owned MNCs were defined as wholly or majority Irish-owned 
organizations with 500 or more employees worldwide and at least 100 employed 
abroad. Foreign-owned MNCs were defined as wholly or majority foreign-owned 
organizations operating in Ireland, with 500 or more employees worldwide and 100 or 
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more employed in their Irish operations. (A detailed exposition of the methodological 
process followed can be found in McDonnell et al. 2007). These definitions were 
based on that used by the European Works Council Directive (94/45/EC) but we 
reduced the employment criteria from 1,000 worldwide to 500 so as to not exclude 
moderately sized MNCs. This resulted in a total population of 563 MNCs (491 
foreign- and 72 Irish-owned). We then took a stratified, random sample of 414 MNCs 
according to country of ownership, employment size and sector. A key rationale 
behind taking a stratified sampling was the high proportion of US MNCs in the 
population and wanting to capture a spread of nationalities and the pragmatic issue of 
insufficient resources to conduct more than 300 interviews which our predicted 
response rate would have meant. Consequently, not all US MNCs were selected as it 
would have meant they were over sampled. 
 
The second stage of the project was data collection. This took the form of a survey 
instrument that was administered through a face-to-face interview with the most 
senior HR practitioner, able to answer for all of the Irish operations. The data 
collection process commenced with each target respondent being sent a letter 
informing them of the study’s aims and benefits etc., along with a letter of support 
from the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development. Following this, the 
research team began phoning each target respondent with the aim of obtaining their 
participation by way of an interview. Each interview took between 40 and 60 minutes 
and consisted primarily of dichotomous and scale response questions with a very 
small number of open questions. The decision to administer the survey via interview 
as opposed to other forms (e.g. postal/online) was due to two main reasons. Firstly, 
the interview approach appears to be associated with higher response rates than other 
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administration methods (Baruch and Holtom 2008). Secondly, interviews have been 
lauded for their ability to reduce the amount of missing data (McKnight, McKnight, 
Sidani and Figueredo 2007). The data collection phase resulted in a total of 260 
MNCs participating (213 foreign and 47 indigenous MNCs) ‒ an overall response rate 
of 63%. We checked for non-response bias by analyzing the profile of the participant 
MNCs according to their country of origin, employment size and sector, (i.e. the 
criteria used for sample stratification and key variables of interest in the overall study) 
with the total population of MNCs. This analysis indicated no significant differences 
between the organisations that participated and those that did not. Table 1 highlights 
the key characteristics of the respondent MNCs.  
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
3.2 Measures 
This paper explores the extent to which MNCs formally identify a critical group of 
non-managerial employees (called the ‘key group’), and whether there is a 
differentiated approach in compensation practices between the key group, managerial 
group and largest occupational group. In each interview respondents were initially 
provided with explanations of these employee categories.  
• Managers ‒ employees who primarily manage the organization, or a 
department, subdivision, function, or component of the organization and 
whose main tasks consist of the direction and coordination of the functioning 
of the organization. In other words, managers refer to those above the level of 
first-line supervision.   
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• Largest Occupational Group ‒ the largest non-managerial occupational group 
among the employees in the ‘headcount’ in Ireland.  For example, in a 
manufacturing business it might be semi-skilled operators, and in an insurance 
company it might be call centre staff. 
• The Key Group – those employees whom you might identify as critical to your 
firm’s organizational learning and core competence. These might be research 
staff, product designers, major account handlers, developers of new markets, 
etc. We do not want you to think of a subgroup of management.  
 
The interviewees were then asked to indicate the number of managers in the Irish 
operations before being asked to state the name and work undertaken by the largest 
occupational group and the number employed in the Irish operations. Respondents 
were then asked to report whether they recognized a key group in the Irish operations. 
If they answered, ‘Yes – more than one group’, they were asked to focus on the group 
with ‘the most unique skills and capabilities that may be difficult to obtain on the 
external labor market’, ‘were the largest group’ or ‘both’.  
 
The focus in the paper was on compensation practices. This is an area where one 
might expect to find differences between employees based on their strategic value to 
the organization. Pay level policy is vital to maximizing an organization’s ability to 
attract and retain employees as it depicts the competitiveness of pay in the market 
(Milkovich, Newman and Gerhart, 2014). Similarly, financial participation schemes 
(e.g. profit sharing) are likely to be used to assist with attracting and retaining talent 
and encouraging employee commitment (D’Art and Turner 2004). Overall, a firm’s 
approach to compensation represents a cornerstone of HR strategy (e.g. Boyd and 
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Salamin 2001). We recognize that this paper does not encompass the vast range of 
options that organizations can conceivably offer to their workforce. As the key group 
was an exploratory concept in our study, we only considered some of the most 
established and traditional compensation practices.   
 
The first measure asks about the pay policy of the MNC with regard to where it aims 
to be (top quartile, 2nd quartile, median/midpoint, below median/midpoint) in relation 
to pay levels and market comparators for our three employee pools. Second, we asked 
about whether approved employee share ownership schemes (AESOS), profit sharing 
and share options were offered to the key group, managers and largest occupational 
group. AESOS refers to where the organizations establish a trust which acquires 
shares on behalf of employees and provides employees with part ownership of the 
company. Profit sharing refers to rewards given to employees in addition to normal 
salary and bonuses which are dependent on the levels of profit in the business. Share 
options are where employees are given the option of buying company shares, often at 
a reduced rate. Third, we asked whether any of the employee pools received variable 
pay. Variable pay was defined as including, merit pay, performance related pay, 
performance related bonuses or payment by results. All questions measured the actual 
situation in the organization rather than measuring the ideal situation or intentions. A 
sample of some of the questions used can be found in the appendix.  
 
3.3 Statistical analysis 
We utilize frequency and crosstab analysis in the first part of the results section. 
Following this we use χ2 tests to compare the extent to which the key group 
statistically differs from the largest occupational group and managers in terms of our 
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five measures of compensation practices. χ2 tests are particularly useful in that they 
assess the extent to which differences in categorical variables are statistically 
meaningful. We also include t-tests to measure whether differences occurred in the 
average number of compensation practices made available to workers. Finally, we 
incorporate logistic regressions to test differentiation in individual practice 
availability across sectors. This allows for a comparison of the extent to which our 
measures vary across the key group, largest occupational group, and managers 
depending on whether the firm belongs to traditional manufacturing, high-tech 
manufacturing, finance/business, retail/distribution/hotel/catering, or other sectors. 
Traditional manufacturing industry is used as the reference point throughout our 
regression analysis and we control for the company’s country of origin and worldwide 
employment size in all models. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive Analysis: The Presence of Key Groups 
 
The study showed that just over half (52%) of all MNCs identified a key group of 
non-managerial employees (see Table 1). No significant differences were found 
between whether the MNC was indigenous- or foreign-owned (52% versus 53% 
respectively). Of these, almost 32% recognized more than one group. In such cases, 
we asked respondents to select the group that was most unique in that they possess 
skills or capabilities that are difficult to obtain in the labor market. If they could not 
differentiate on this basis they were then asked to select the largest group. Some 82% 
of those that initially identified more than one key group were able to select one group 
based on having the most unique skills and capabilities; 13% selected the group based 
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on this but also noted that they were the largest group, and the remaining 5% made 
their selection based on being the largest group. 
 
We categorized the majority of key groups (64%) as technical staff, which 
encompasses R&D specialists, chemists, engineers, quality technicians and product 
designers. Key sales employees (10%) and operational and support staff (8%) 
encompassed the other main categories identified. Invariably the key group was 
relatively small with almost seven in ten (67%) MNCs reporting that they 
encompassed less than 50 employees.  
 
4.2 Statistical Analysis: Differentiation by Employee Groups   
Table 2 highlights the frequency of use for each of the compensation practices among 
our three groups of employees. Differences are clearly evident. The key group were 
the most likely to be subject of a deliberate policy which seeks to provide pay levels 
in the top (31%) and 2nd quartiles (29%) of pay relative to market comparators. The 
largest occupational group were most likely to be paid at the median or midpoint level 
as demonstrated by the response from 60% of all MNCs. We found that the largest 
occupational group were the least likely to benefit from any of the three financial 
participation schemes. The key group were slightly more likely than managers to be 
offered AESOS (35% versus 32%) and profit sharing (35% versus 34%). On the other 
hand, managers were more likely to be offered share options (49% for managers 
versus 40% for key group). Differences in the use of performance related pay between 
the key group and managers were limited (86% versus 91% respectively). However, 
the key group were considerably more likely to have performance related pay vis-à-
vis the largest occupational group.  
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Insert Table 2 here 
 
Table 3 provides the results of two-way contingency tables of differentiation in 
individual portions of a firm’s approach to compensation. These tables compare the 
key group against the largest occupational group and also against managers on our 
five compensation practice measures. We use Pearson’s χ2 tests (supplemented with 
Fisher’s exact tests, though these are not reported within the table) to assess the extent 
to which the proportions found within each contingency table are independent. A 
statistically significant χ2 test would indicate the presence of differentiation across 
employee group pairings. 
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
Statistically significant differences by employee group emerged when looking at the 
practice of compensating workers with top quartile pay (χ2=45.321 when compared to 
the key group with the largest occupational group, p<.01; χ2=54.339 and the key 
group with managers, p<.01). Where firms recognize a key group, our results indicate 
differentiation between the key group and the largest occupational group in 49% of 
the cases. That is to say, when the key group was awarded top quartile pay, in almost 
half of these cases the largest occupational group was not. Further, in cases where the 
key group was not given pay in the top quartile, firms very rarely (only 2% of the 
time) chose to provide top quartile pay to the largest occupational group instead. The 
key group also enjoyed differentiation when compared against managers on this 
measure. In cases where the key group was awarded pay in the top quartile, this 
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practice was not also provided for managers 36% of the time. On the other hand, 
when the key group was not granted high pay, managers rarely (in only 4% of the 
cases) received it instead. Overall, it was more often the case that the key group 
received top quartile pay when others did not than the reverse (i.e., other groups being 
in receipt of top quartile pay but not the key group). 
 
Smaller, though still significant, variation was found in terms of AESOS for each 
group (χ2=121.367 when comparing the key group with the largest occupational 
group, p<.01; χ2=121.539 when comparing the key group with managers, p<.01). In 
most cases, when the key group was given an opportunity for AESOS, so too were the 
largest occupational group and managers. By equal measure, whenever the key group 
was not included in AESOS possibilities, it was rare for any other employee groups to 
be offered them. Similar results were found for profit sharing (χ2=109.035 when 
comparing the key group with the largest occupational group, p<.01; χ2=95.571 when 
comparing the key group with managers, p<.01). In 7% of cases the key group were 
treated differently from the largest occupational group in terms of profit sharing plans 
– i.e., the key group was given profit sharing but the largest occupational group was 
not. Differentiation for profit sharing between the key group and managers was also 
found in 8% of the cases; the key group was not offered this option but managers 
were.  
 
Differentiation also occurred across employee groups when considering the 
availability of share options (χ2=63.156 when comparing the key group with the 
largest occupational group, p<.01; χ2=61.472 when comparing the key group with 
managers, p<.01). In 38% of cases where firms offered this provision to their key 
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group, they did not offer to the largest occupational group. Equally, when this option 
was unavailable to the key group, it was also unavailable to the largest occupational 
group in virtually every firm (that is, no firm offered share options to the largest 
occupational group but not the key group). Differentiation also occurred between the 
key group and managers. In nearly a quarter of cases, managers were provided with 
share options when the key group was not. In only 6% of cases were the key group 
given this option without it also being available to managers. On the whole, it was 
more often the case that key groups received share options when the largest 
occupational group did not, but it was not commonly the case that the key group 
received this practice without managers also enjoying. 
 
We discovered considerable differentiation with respect to variable pay (χ2=16.586 
when comparing the key group with the largest occupational group, p<.01; χ2=31.060 
when comparing the key group with managers, p<.01). In 23% of cases, when the key 
group was provided with variable pay, the largest occupational group was not. 
However, when the key group did not receive variable pay, this pay scheme was 
instead provided to the largest occupational group in 32% of cases. Equally, the key 
group essentially never received performance-based pay without managers also 
receiving it; yet, in cases where the key group did not receive variable pay, the 
scheme was still provided to managers 68% of the time. These results indicate that it 
was more often the case that the largest occupational group and managers received 
variable pay schemes without the key group also receiving these schemes than the 
reverse (i.e., the key group receiving variable pay while other groups did not). 
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Moving beyond individual compensation practice differentiation, we considered 
whether firms offered higher numbers of aggregate practices to the different groups of 
employees. We counted the total number of practices employed by each firm, which 
could range from zero to five. Table 4 provides results for the independent samples t-
test analysis of differentiation in the mean number of compensation practices at each 
group. The results indicate differentiation between the key group and the largest 
occupational group, with the key group given a greater aggregate number of practices, 
at 2.2 out of a possible 5 practices, compared with only 1.7 for the largest 
occupational group (p<.05). Conversely, a statistically identical number of practices 
were made available when comparing the key group with managers. 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
We also explored the extent to which a firm’s industry shapes the extent to which our 
measures of compensation practices were offered to the key group, largest 
occupational group, and managers (Table 5). We found some variation across 
industries in the extent to which firms offer top quartile pay to their key groups. 
Finance/business companies were over six times more likely (p<.05) to offer this 
practice to their key workers than traditional manufacturing companies. A similar 
result was found among ‘other’ companies (p<.10). This variation was exclusive to 
the key group – no differentiation by industry occurred in terms of top quartile pay for 
the largest occupational group or for managers. 
 
In terms of share ownership, we found no evidence of industry differences for the key 
group or for the largest occupational group. However, managers from high-tech 
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manufacturing firms were more likely to receive AESOS than managers from 
traditional manufacturing companies (p<.10). Regarding profit sharing, there was no 
evidence of differentiation across industries and employee groupings. For share 
options, there was a small amount of differentiation. Within the key group, 
finance/business firms were three times more likely (p<.10) to provide share options 
than traditional manufacturing companies. There was no difference by industry in 
terms of share options for the largest occupational group or managers. 
 
Looking at variable pay, we found some differentiation by industry. Among the key 
group, those in the ‘other’ category of industry were over nine times more likely 
(p<.10) to offer variable pay than traditional manufacturing companies. Conversely, 
within the largest occupational group, firms in ‘other’ industries were significantly 
less likely than manufacturing companies to offer their workers variable pay (p<.10). 
Finally, for managers, firms in retail/distribution/hotels/catering were over seven 
times more likely to have variable pay than traditional manufacturing companies 
(p<.10).1 
 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
5. Discussion, Conclusions and Implications 
Resource based theory suggests that value of human capital stems, in part, from its 
capacity to contribute to the achievement of business strategies (Barney 1991). Both 
strategic HRM and talent management scholarship has called on organizations to 
                                                 
1 We also used chi-square tests to assess whether having one versus having more than one key group 
differs depending on the characteristics of the firm (country of origin, size, sector) and the answer was 
again, no. As such we can safely conclude that there is no difference in either the composition of the 
companies having one or more than one key group, nor is there any difference in the treatment of these 
groups in terms of compensation practices. 
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formally recognize that some employees and roles are more important than others and 
then make disproportionate investments towards those strategic roles and employees 
(Huselid, Beatty and Becker 2005; Huselid and Becker 2011). Yanadori and Kang 
(2011, p. 253) remark that ‘researchers seem to have accepted the notion of intra-firm 
differentiation of HRM systems’ but that evidence on whether such differences 
actually occur is lacking. This paper has found that just in excess of half of the 
surveyed MNCs formally identify key groups of employees deemed critical to the 
firm’s core competences and organizational learning. Consequently, the paper found 
some support for the need to consider the application of RBT beyond managerial 
talent or elites. However, it was also evident that strategically identified employee 
groups were not necessarily a uniformly common feature of all organizations. This we 
contend makes it important that future research on this topic moves beyond clustering 
job roles and arguing they automatically represent a key or strategic employee 
grouping. There is scope to develop more refined and sophisticated measures to more 
accurately gauge the presence of strategic employee groups beyond existing means. It 
could, therefore, be argued that the focus of researchers may move more in the 
direction of identifying various cohorts of workers as opposed to treating the 
workforce as one large group. 
 
Differentiation in the application of compensation practices was common between the 
key group, managers and the largest occupational group. This provides support to the 
HR architecture and talent management literatures which stress the need for 
discrimination in HR practices according to strategic value and contribution of 
employees. Lepak and Snell (1999, p. 32) argued that, ‘it may be inappropriate to 
simplify the nature of human capital investments and suggest that there exists a single 
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optimal HR architecture for managing all employees’. Similarly, Jackson et al. (1989) 
noted that different groups of employees have varying importance to an 
organization’s competitive advantage which means that the HR management 
approach should also vary between groups of staff. On the whole, our results that 
were focused on compensation pointed to the greatest magnitude of differentiation 
between the key group and the largest occupational group. As our second table 
indicates, the key group is, by and large, closer on many compensation practice 
offerings to managers than to the largest occupational group. This differentiation was 
also confirmed statistically in our third and fourth tables. This suggests that the key 
groups are treated as being of sufficiently greater strategic value than those 
performing the more operational activities of the organization (i.e. largest non-
managerial occupational group). This result provides some support that many MNCs 
were adopting a contingent approach to compensation whereby particular 
compensation practices were only available to the key group and not the largest 
occupational group. There were less visible differences between the practices 
provided to the key group and managers.  
 
The key group, where identified, appear therefore to be viewed as similar in strategic 
importance to managers. While managers are commonly provided with share options, 
profit sharing and share ownership schemes, it is worth noting that the key group were 
typically more likely to receive top quartile pay when compared to market 
comparators. Some differentiation by industry was evident but there was no great 
discernible pattern evident across all practices. The only minor pattern to emerge was 
that there was greater provision of top quartile pay and share options to key groups in 
the financial and business services sector. Overall though, the results, while 
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significant, do indicate that there were less discernible  differences between the key 
group and managers on issues like top quartile pay and share options. This poses a 
key question, worthy of future investigation, as to whether organizations have the 
right balance in their compensation strategy to motivate and retain employees that are 
encompassed both across and within these key groupings. Lepak and Snell (1999, p. 
42) contend that, ‘despite the practical appeal and theoretical parsimony of a “one-
size-fits-all” approach to HR management, employment modes in most organizations 
are not this homogenous, and HR systems are rarely this monolithic’. Our results 
suggest that variation may exist beyond an employment mode or type 
conceptualization. This, we contend, intimates that greater attention is needed on the 
potential differences in the people management systems applied in organizations 
across different employee groups. This is something which talent management 
scholars are increasingly recommending to organizations (e.g. Collings and Mellahi 
2009). 
 
We are cognizant that like any research study, there are some limitations that should 
be identified. The use of a single respondent (Bowman and Ambrosini 1997) could be 
construed as a possible limitation and is thus acknowledged. In saying that, we argue 
that our selection of the most senior HR practitioner helps offset this due to their 
expertise (see Wright, Gardner, Moynihan and Park 2001). In other words, the 
respondent was the key informant. To further reduce the possibility of there being an 
issue with drawing on a single-respondent input, informants were advised in advance 
of the information we would be seeking and, following advice of scholars, we spent a 
significant degree of time on developing and piloting the instrument before 
administration (Wright et al. 2001).  
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Additionally, although we capture a variety of reward practices in our data set, we are 
limited by the possibility that other practices might be available to employees that are 
not included in our data set. These omitted variables might affect our fourth table in 
particular, where we find that the absolute number of practices available across a firm 
varies between the LOG and the key group. It remains possible that other practices, 
for which we do not account in our questionnaire, might conceivably be given to the 
LOG but not the key group, which would diminish evidence in differentiation across 
the absolute number of reward practices provided. We therefore urge some caution in 
interpreting the results from the fourth table, and recommend that future research 
endeavors to more holistically assess differentiation by employee groups in terms of 
the total award practices made available. 
 
We view this research as a starting point to further explore whether organizations 
actually formally determine strategic employee groupings and whether they 
subsequently adopt discerning managerial approaches to them. Future research that 
seeks to establish if the differentiated practices in place for the various employee 
groups lead to improved productivity and performance would be most worthwhile. 
Our study was only able to provide descriptive evidence on the use of compensation 
practices; we were unable to consider the impact on different facets of performance.  
High quality human capital is not sufficient in its own right to build competitive 
advantage. Firms need to be organized in a way that enables them to effectively use 
their talent in the best means (Ulrich and Lake 1991; Barney 1995). We call for 
research exploring the HR approaches adopted for each employee group and their 
impact on productivity and performance. While there is endorsement of 
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differentiating HRM systems by employee groups, there has been some evidence that 
points to negative consequences from diversity of compensation practices (Bloom 
1999). There is little doubt that this research lends itself to being illuminated through 
the use of multiple methodological approaches.  
 
Ideally, the study would have incorporated additional parts of HRM systems. We are 
conscious of the emerging talent management literature and the importance placed on 
intrinsic factors, development and career management. Being able to explore such 
aspects would have undoubtedly allowed greater determinations to be made and such 
an expansion is recommended in follow-up research. For instance, the collection of 
additional data on career management, development activities and relationships with 
job performance and turnover would be useful to allow greater conclusions to be 
made, such as the impact of practices on different groups of employees. The Abilities, 
Motivation, Opportunity to participate model (i.e. AMO-model) is popular in this type 
of research (e.g. Boselie et al. 2005; Edwards, Tregaskis, Sanchez-Mangas, Levesque, 
McDonnell and Quintanilla 2013). Our focus here was on extrinsic financial factors 
(i.e. the motivation dimension) but we recommend that future research in this area 
would expand on the financial factors to also include practices that relate the ‘A’ and 
‘O’ dimension. Being able to demonstrate variety on a fuller spectrum of HR practices 
and policies would undoubtedly add considerably. This paper does, however, 
represent a useful starting point. The use of a longitudinal research design would also 
be worthwhile to allow one to decipher if there is greater or less identification of key 
groups and changes in the HR approaches used over time. 
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Some MNCs recognized more than one key group but due to the nature of this 
research project respondents were forced to select one key group only. In future, 
researchers might explore whether there are differentiated HR practices between 
different key groups within the one organization. Being able to develop greater depth 
to the characteristics of the key group concept and how organizations go about 
formally identifying this group would be of considerable value. A final point worthy 
of future consideration is garnering an understanding of whether particular contextual 
factors predict the identification and management of key groups (e.g. occupational 
nature, country of ownership, strategic roles). 
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Table 1: Characteristics of Participating MNCs 
N = 260 (total sample); N = 135 (Key Group sample). Percentages rounded up. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country of origin Ireland US UK Europe Rest of 
world 
Total 
       
Worldwide Employment       
< 500 – 999 19% 6% 0 5% 0 7% 
1,000 – 4,999 51% 15% 20% 24% 7% 24% 
5,000 – 29,999  28% 32% 40% 33% 57% 34% 
30,000 – 59,999 2% 20% 17% 10% 14% 13% 
≥ 60,000 0 28% 23% 29% 21% 22% 
       
Irish Employment       
100 – 499 26% 56% 51% 70% 71% 54% 
500 – 999 17% 17% 17% 13% 21% 16% 
≥ 1,000 58% 27% 31% 18% 7% 30% 
       
Primary Sector       
Traditional manufacturing 30% 9% 20% 11% 7% 15% 
High-tech manufacturing 4% 48% 6% 38% 43% 32% 
Financial & business 
services 
 
Key Group Recognition 
 
     Key Group Type: 
Technical staff 
Senior managers 
Other managers 
Sales 
Customer-related staff 
Operational and support 
Other 
 
     Key Group Size: 
1 – 49 
≥ 50 
21% 
 
 
53% 
 
 
42% 
13% 
13% 
8% 
0 
17% 
8% 
 
 
67% 
33% 
37% 
 
 
50% 
 
 
80% 
0 
2% 
6% 
2% 
4% 
6% 
 
 
61% 
39% 
34% 
 
 
49% 
 
 
63% 
6% 
13% 
13% 
0 
0 
6% 
 
 
77% 
24% 
27% 
 
 
58% 
 
 
58% 
0 
3% 
17% 
0 
8% 
14% 
 
 
69% 
31% 
21% 
 
 
50% 
 
 
71% 
0 
0 
0 
0 
29% 
0 
 
 
71% 
29% 
30% 
 
 
52% 
 
 
64% 
3% 
5% 
10% 
1% 
8% 
8% 
 
 
67% 
33% 
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Table 2: Frequency Analysis of HR Practices Used Per Employee Category 
(Total N Values in Brackets) 
 
 LOG Key Group Managers 
Pay Policy 
To be in Top Quartile 
To be in 2nd Quartile 
To be at the Median 
Below the Median 
 
Financial Participation Schemes 
Employee Share Ownership 
Profit Sharing 
Share Options 
 
Variable Pay 
Merit or Performance-Based Pay 
 
Mean Number of Reward Practices 
(245) 
18% 
21% 
60% 
1% 
 
 
30% (254) 
27% (236) 
24% (241) 
 
 
67% (257) 
 
1.7 
(127) 
31% 
29% 
40% 
0 
 
 
35% (130) 
35% (124) 
40% (128) 
 
 
86% (134) 
 
2.2 
(247) 
23% 
29% 
48% 
0.4% 
 
 
32% (253) 
34% (236) 
49% (244) 
 
 
91% (255) 
 
2.4 
LOG refers to the company’s largest occupational group. Percentages rounded up. 
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Table 3: Two-way Contingency Tables of Individual Compensation Reward 
Practices by Employee Group 
 
 LOG  Managers 
 IS THE GROUP GIVEN TOP QUARTILE PAY? 
  No Yes   No Yes 
Key  
Group 
No 98% 2% No 96% 4% 
Yes 49% 51% Yes 36% 64% 
 χ2 = 45.321** χ2 = 54.399** 
 N = 127  N = 127 
  
 IS THE GROUP GIVEN SHARE OWNERSHIP? 
  No Yes   No Yes 
Key  
Group 
No 100% 0% No 98% 2% 
Yes 4% 96% Yes 0% 100% 
 χ2 =121.367** χ2 = 121.539** 
 N = 130  N = 130 
  
 IS THE GROUP GIVEN PROFIT SHARING? 
  No Yes   No Yes 
Key  
Group 
No 100% 0% No 92% 8% 
Yes 7% 93% Yes 2% 98% 
 χ2 = 109.035** χ2 = 95.571** 
 N = 122  N = 123 
  
 IS THE GROUP GIVEN SHARE OPTIONS? 
  No Yes   No Yes 
Key  
Group 
No 100% 0% No 77% 23% 
Yes 38% 62% Yes 6% 94% 
 χ2 = 63.156** χ2 = 61.472** 
 N = 127  N = 128 
  
 IS THE GROUP GIVEN VARIABLE PAY? 
  No Yes   No Yes 
Key  
Group 
No 68% 32% No 32% 68% 
Yes 23% 77% Yes 1% 99% 
 χ2 = 16.586** χ2 = 31.060** 
 N = 134  N = 134 
** = significant at .01 level; * = significant at .05 level; + = significant at .10 level  
Percentages rounded up. 
The ‘no/no’ and ‘yes/yes’ values indicate identical treatment between the key group and the  
LOG refers to the company’s largest occupational group. 
LOG/managers. The ‘yes/no’ and ‘no/yes’ values indicate differentiated treatment between the key 
group and the LOG/managers. 
Note: Pearson’s χ2 values are reported for each two-way contingency table. Since these values can be 
unreliable for small sample sizes, Fisher’s exact test has also been run though it is not reported in the 
table. No differences in statistical significance are found when using Fisher’s exact test instead of 
Pearson’s χ2 test. 
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Table 4: Means and T-Tests for Counts of Compensation Reward Practices by 
Employee Group 
 
Variable LOG Mean 
 
Key Group Mean  Managers Mean 
 
Number of Compensation 
Reward Practices 
1.7 
 
2.2 2.4 
Difference between Key 
Group and LOG/Managers 
0.49* 
 
-0.20 
N = 115 
** = significant at .01 level; * = significant at .05 level; + = significant at .10 level  
Note: These results assume a continuous, rather than categorical, count of the number of reward 
practices by employee group. Under a categorical assumption, the appropriate approach would be a 
series of χ2 tests on contingency tables. These contingency table χ2 tests have been run and produce 
results demonstrating differentiation between the LOG and key groups, as well as much smaller 
differentiation between key groups and managers. For ease of interpretation, we report the t-test results 
in this paper, but contingency table results are available on request. 
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Table 5: Logistic Regression of Compensation Reward Practices by Industry 
Sector 
 
 Key Group 
(N = 120) 
LOG 
(N = 245) 
Managers 
(N = 247) 
Coeff. 
(S.E.) 
Odds Coeff. 
(S.E.) 
Odds Coeff. 
(S.E.) 
Odds 
 
 
 
Top-
Quartile Pay 
High-Tech 
Manufacturing 
.890 
(.977) 
2.435 -.979 
(.598) 
.375 .015 
(.594) 
1.015 
Finance/ 
Business 
1.838* 
(.894) 
6.283 -.151 
(.534) 
.860 .585 
(.540) 
1.795 
Retail/Distribution/ 
Hotels/Catering 
1.017 
(1.031) 
2.766 .197 
(.592) 
1.217 .828 
(.587) 
2.290 
Other 
 
1.765+ 
(1.001) 
5.846 -.412 
(.784) 
.662 1.063 
(.669) 
2.894 
 
 
 
Share 
Ownership 
High-Tech 
Manufacturing 
.811 
(.710) 
2.250 .779 
(.517) 
2.179 .861+ 
(.506) 
2.366 
Finance/ 
Business 
.131 
(.662) 
1.140 .207 
(.486) 
1.230 .252 
(.474) 
1.287 
Retail/Distribution/ 
Hotels/Catering 
-.494 
(.828) 
.610 -.064 
(.547) 
.938 -.166 
(.538) 
.847 
Other 
 
-1.719 
(1.223) 
.179 -.851 
(.869) 
.427 -1.009 
(.862) 
.365 
 
 
 
Profit 
Sharing 
High-Tech 
Manufacturing 
-.442 
(.686) 
.642 -.026 
(.513) 
.974 -.124 
(.490) 
.883 
Finance/ 
Business 
.186 
(.630) 
1.205 .271 
(.475) 
1.312 .185 
(.458) 
1.203 
Retail/Distribution/ 
Hotels/Catering 
-.239 
(.799) 
.788 -.447 
(.574) 
.640 -.132 
(.519) 
.876 
Other 
 
.644 
(.774) 
1.903 -.125 
(.698) 
.883 .546 
(.620) 
1.726 
 
 
 
Share 
Options 
High-Tech 
Manufacturing 
.865 
(.693) 
2.374 -.610 
(.514) 
.543 .452 
(.484) 
1.572 
Finance/ 
Business 
1.142+ 
(.650) 
3.133 -.094 
(.478) 
.910 .332 
(.449) 
1.394 
Retail/Distribution/ 
Hotels/Catering 
.457 
(.789) 
1.579 -.632 
(.597) 
.532 -.477 
(.510) 
.621 
Other 
 
-.601 
(.961) 
.548 -.734 
(.747) 
.480 -.302 
(.619) 
.739 
 
 
 
Variable 
Pay 
High-Tech 
Manufacturing 
.646 
(.845) 
1.909 -.150 
(.459) 
.861 .404 
(.687) 
1.497 
Finance/ 
Business 
1.276 
(.789) 
3.584 .730 
(.457) 
2.076 .824 
(.664) 
2.280 
Retail/Distribution/ 
Hotels/Catering 
1.520 
(1.018) 
4.573 .137 
(.493) 
1.146 1.978+ 
(1.122) 
7.228 
Other 
 
2.320+ 
(1.252) 
10.176 -.991+ 
(.593) 
.371 .753 
(.883) 
2.124 
** = significant at .01 level; * = significant at .05 level; + = significant at .10 level  
Controls: country of origin and employment size. Reference category: traditional manufacturing 
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Appendix – Sample of relevant questions from the survey 
 
Thinking of policy in [COMPANY NAME] in Ireland  as a whole on pay levels in relation to 
market comparators, do [COMPANY NAME] in Ireland aim to be…?   
 [READ OUT SHOWCARD 15 – CODE ONLY ONE FOR EACH CATEGORY]  
 [READ OUT: Please include formal and informal policy]  
[READ IF NECESSARY: The median/midpoint is the middle value or 50th percentile i.e. if ‘the 
median’ is selected, the aim is to have pay levels at the centre/middle point in relation to 
market comparators.] 
 
SHOWCARD 15 
In the top quartile In the second 
quartile 
At the median/ 
midpoint 
Below the median/ 
midpoint 
 
 In the In the  At the Below the DK 
Do [Company Name] aim to be … top second median/  median/    
 quartile midpoint midpoint 
For [LOG Name]  ...............................................   .................   .................   ....................    
For [Key Group  Name]  ....................................   .................   .................   ....................    
For managers ......................................................   .................   .................   ....................    
 
Does [COMPANY NAME] in Ireland offer the following to any employees in each of these 
groups? [READ OUT SHOWCARD 16] 
 
 
 
 AESOS Profit Sharing Share Options 
 Yes No DK Yes No DK Yes No  DK 
For [LOG Name]  ...........   ...........  ......  ..............  ......  ....  .........  ......   
For [Key Group Name]  .   ...........  ......  ..............  ......  ....  .........  ......   
For managers ..................   ...........  ......  ..............  ......  ....  .........  ......    
 
Note: DK = Don’t know 
 
IS there variable pay for the following groups in [COMPANY NAME] in Ireland? By 
variable pay we mean merit pay, performance related pay, performance related bonuses 
or payment by results 
  Yes No  DK  
For [LOG Name]  ......................  ..............  .............  ........  
For [Key Group Name]  ............  ..............  .............  ........  
For managers        
 
SHOWCARD 16 
1.  Approved employee share ownership scheme (AESOS) is where the organisation 
establishes a trust which acquires shares on behalf of employees and provides 
employees with part ownership of the company. 
2. Profit sharing refers to rewards given to employees in addition to normal salary and 
bonuses which are dependent on the levels of profit in the business. 
3. Share options is where employees are given the option of buying company shares, 
often at a reduced rate. 
